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PROCESS COSTS AND POLICE DISCRETION 
Charlie Gerstein and J.J. Prescott∗ 
Cities across the country are debating police discretion.  Much of this debate centers on 
“public order” offenses.  These minor offenses are unusual in that the actual sentence 
violators receive when convicted — usually time already served in detention — is 
beside the point.  Rather, public order offenses are enforced prior to any conviction by 
subjecting accused individuals to arrest, detention, and other legal process.  These 
“process costs” are significant; they distort plea bargaining to the point that the 
substantive law behind the bargained-for conviction is largely irrelevant.  But the 
ongoing debate about police discretion has ignored the centrality of these process costs.  
Many scholars have argued that vague terms and broad standards in defining public 
order crimes result in broad discretion that leads to abuse.  In this Essay, we argue 
instead that criminal law process costs essentially decouple statutory language from 
actual police behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely moot.  
Abuse is better addressed by first recognizing that, in the context of public order crimes, 
discretion has little to do with substantive criminal law.  Instead, policymakers should 
focus on mitigating the harmful consequences discretion can generate and on limiting 
police discretion through other means.  To this end, we propose providing the police 
with new civil enforcement tools that will be equally effective at preserving order but 
that will in all likelihood cause significantly less unnecessary harm. 
Cities across the country are debating police discretion.  New York, 
for example, has recently endeavored to end its controversial practice 
of stopping and frisking citizens as a matter of course.1  The debate 
over police discretion implicates fundamental questions about the role 
of police in American society, racial discrimination in the criminal sys-
tem, and the disproportionate use of violence by the police against 
young black men.  Much of the debate over the proper scope of police 
discretion centers on reforming the criminal code to decriminalize or 
eliminate minor crimes.  This Essay argues that the debate over the 
proper scope of police discretion should instead focus on the real 
source of that discretion: the process costs of low-level adjudication. 
Minor crimes are a big problem.  In 2006 alone, Americans were 
charged with and detained on misdemeanor offenses approximately 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Charlie Gerstein is a Law Clerk to the Honorable J. Paul Oetken, United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, and a Research Fellow at the University of South-
ern California Gould School of Law.  J.J. Prescott is a Professor at the University of Michigan 
Law School.  We would like to thank Josh Bowers, Seth Bowers, Sam Erman, Alec Ewald,  
Colleen Fitzharris, Nick Frayn, Kate Gilbert, Sam Gross, Jason Harrow, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, 
Justin Marceau, Joshua Matz, Eve Brensike Primus, John Rappaport, Laurent Sacharoff, Alex 
Sarch, and Sonja Starr for their helpful comments on early drafts.  We are also grateful to partici-
pants at the Robina Institute’s annual conference on the Future of the Criminal Law. 
 1 E.g., Joseph Ax, NYC Police to Reform Public Housing Stop-And-Frisk in Settlement, 
REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2015, 4:38 PM), h t t p : / / w w w . r e u t e r s . c o m / a r t i c l e / 2 0 1 5 / 0 1 / 0 8 / u s - u s a - n e w y o r k 
-stopandfrisk-idUSKBN0KH25R20150108 [http://perma.cc/L633-4ABD]. 
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10.5 million times.2  These cases have serious long-term consequences 
for defendants, their families, and our criminal justice institutions.3  
They create criminal convictions and criminal records.4  They crowd 
our jails.5  And minor convictions are usually imposed with little pro-
cess, without counsel, and often regardless of factual guilt or inno-
cence.6  Worse, these crimes and convictions arguably form the core of 
our criminal justice system: while most people incarcerated in the 
United States were convicted of a felony, a large majority of criminal 
sentences imposed come from misdemeanor and violation convictions.7 
Many of these minor convictions result from what are often called 
“public order” offenses.8  These offenses are relatively petty to be 
sure, but their more important defining feature is that the actual sen-
tence violators receive for their transgressions — usually time already 
served in detention via a guilty plea — is not the “punishment” that 
ought to matter to policymakers.  In practice, our criminal justice  
system primarily enforces public order prohibitions prior to any con-
viction by subjecting the accused to arrest, detention, and other legal 
process.9  These “process costs” are significant; they include not just 
pre-trial detention, but also the hassle of pre-trial and trial proceedings 
and the risk and uncertainty that those proceedings necessarily en-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MI-
NOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDE-
MEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), h t t p s : / / w w w . n a c d l . o r g / W o r k A r e a / D o w n l o a d A s s e t . a s p x ? i d = 2 0 8 0 8 
[https://perma.cc/8H2H-7E74?type=pdf]. 
 3 See id. at 11–13; see also Marc Santora, City’s Annual Cost Per Inmate Is Nearly $168,000, 
Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/nyregion/citys-annual 
-cost-per-inmate-is-nearly-168000-study-says.html; Facilities Overview, CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF 
CORR., h t t p : / / w w w . n y c . g o v / h t m l / d o c / h t m l / a b o u t / f a c i l i t i e s - o v e r v i e w . s h t m l (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/9KJ3-XDS4] (noting that on an average day, there are approximately 
11,400 inmates in New York City’s jails).  
 4 E.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012). 
 5 See BORUCHOWITZ, supra note 2, at 7. 
 6 Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2008). 
 7 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1320–21. 
 8 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 556 n.14 (1997) (citing Robert C. 
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and  
Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168, 1217–19 (1996)). 
 9 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES 
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).  For rough estimates of how many defendants plead 
guilty to avoid prolonged detention, see generally Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the 
Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2013) (“In 2010, in New York 
City alone, 16,649 defendants were unable to make bail set at one thousand dollars or less,” id. at 
1515 n.3, and “[d]efendants who are required to post bail that they cannot afford . . . end up 
pleading guilty to avoid waiting in jail,” id. at 1515 (citing Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution 
Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 333, 348–52 (2011))).  
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tail.10  These costs distort plea bargaining so much that the substantive 
law behind the bargained-for conviction becomes irrelevant.11  De-
fendants are likely to spend more time in jail if they contest the charg-
es than if they plead guilty.  Not surprisingly, they almost always 
plead guilty, whether or not they committed the charged offense and 
despite the fact that the criminal conviction may result in serious con-
sequences down the road.12 
Maintaining public order is nevertheless an important civic func-
tion.  Many of these offenses — disorderly conduct, minor trespassing, 
loitering — attempt to serve this function by giving police discretion 
that allows them to disrupt, to isolate, and to sober.13  The use of vague 
terms and broad standards in drafting statutory language can deliver 
such discretion.  In the minds of some, however, discretion leads to 
abuse, a conclusion that has engendered a heated debate about how 
much statutory discretion the law should make available to police.14 
We do not join this battle.  Instead, we suggest that criminal law 
process costs essentially decouple statutory discretion from actual po-
lice behavior, rendering the debate about statutory language largely 
moot.  In other words, in the minor crimes context, process costs — 
not vague statutory terms — produce police discretion.  Abuse is thus 
better addressed by first recognizing that, in the context of public or-
der crimes, discretion has little to do with substantive criminal law 
and that, instead, focus is much better placed on mitigating the harm-
ful consequences that discretion can generate and on limiting police 
discretion through other means.  To this end, we propose providing 
the police with new civil enforcement tools that will be equally effec-
tive at preserving order but that will in all likelihood cause significant-
ly less unnecessary harm.  We believe — counterintuitively, per-
haps — that giving the police an additional power (noncriminal arrest) 
might encourage them to use the power they currently have (criminal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. 
SOC. 351, 374 (2013) (discussing “procedural hassle”  as a technique for control of vulnerable pop-
ulations); see also Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 86 (2007). 
 11 See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563–64 (2004) (arguing that as the severity of the criminal offense decreas-
es, the influence of the substantive law wanes). 
 12 Bowers, supra note 6, at 1119 (discussing the “innocence problem” in plea bargaining); 
Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1323–27 (discussing collateral consequences); Gerstein, supra note 9, at 
1526 (citing Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 987 (1989)).  
 13 See Livingston, supra note 8, at 591–92; see also Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community 
Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 366–67 (2005). 
 14 Compare, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural 
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, and Livingston, supra 
note 8, with, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Steven J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock 
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215.  
  
2015] PROCESS COSTS AND POLICE DISCRETION 271 
arrest) less frequently and, therefore, might reduce the harm that this 
latter power causes. 
Our argument begins with the fact that when the police feel they 
need to arrest someone to keep people safe or to prevent property de-
struction, the police will, in most cases, arrest that person — regard-
less of how specific or general a given city’s criminal code may be.15  
Why?  Because the specificity of the criminal code has little relation-
ship to the costs imposed by an arrest, and it is the ability to impose at 
least some of these costs (for example, temporary removal and deten-
tion) that allow the police to achieve certain ends — disruption, isola-
tion, and others. 
American police have an extraordinarily diverse set of responsibili-
ties,16 and they approach their work with a wide variety of goals in 
mind.  We do not mean to address these goals comprehensively.  Ra-
ther, we focus only on the goal of “maintaining order” — chiefly, con-
trolling or interrupting low-level misconduct and disrupting potential 
short-term violence.  To achieve this goal, police sometimes have no 
choice other than to arrest people in order to temporarily isolate them 
for a few hours or to remove them from a particular location.  In such 
a scenario, police may care about what happens before (and only some 
of what happens before) any conviction, but not the conviction itself or 
its consequences for the defendant. 
If the police in certain circumstances are indifferent to whether a 
defendant is convicted of a crime, a realized conviction is likely to be a 
social waste.  And in any event, code reforms are unlikely to control 
police discretion.  When discretionary arrests turn on considerations 
other than the substantive law that underlies public order criminal of-
fenses, police ought to have tools that do not trigger unnecessary col-
lateral consequences, including criminal records, meaningless pleas, 
unnecessary risk and uncertainty, and useless (from a police officer’s 
perspective) process costs.  Cities should adopt civil ordinances that 
free the police to make discretionary arrests for low-level violations, 
but limit the tendency of those arrests to inflict socially useless harm 
on defendants. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I quickly recounts the re-
alities of low-level criminal punishment in big cities and shows that 
low-level arrests are untethered to substantive law, rendering solutions 
that work within the criminal law unlikely to be effective at control-
ling police discretion.  Part II outlines the debate over discretion to po-
lice public order, and argues that it neglects the reality that substan-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86; David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination 
Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1071–73 
(1999). 
 16 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.  
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tive law is mostly irrelevant to the matter of police discretion in this 
domain.  Part III proposes a solution that comes from a long line of 
police practice: civil laws with strictly limited periods of detention and 
other features designed to reduce or eliminate those process costs that 
have no connection to what police are supposed to be trying to do — 
maintain order. 
Before moving on, we note that the purpose of this Essay is not to 
discuss whether the police should arrest people as often as they appar-
ently do.  Rather, operating on the assumption that the police do feel 
the need to arrest people, we seek to ameliorate the consequences of 
those arrests by reforming the law in a particular way.  As we explain 
below, we believe that our proposal (or something like it) can reduce 
the negative effects of many public order policing arrests without in-
creasing the total number or consequent burdens of such arrests. 
I.  ARRESTS FOR PUBLIC ORDER OFFENSES 
In very low-level misdemeanor prosecutions, the substantive crimi-
nal law that generates the punishment is largely irrelevant.  Instead, a 
conviction is the near-certain result of the arrest, and the punishment 
is the process of criminal arrest, pretrial detention, and adjudication.17 
Consider New York City today.  The police see (or learn of) some-
one doing something they do not like.18  That person is arrested for a 
minor offense,19 usually disorderly conduct,20 trespassing,21 loitering,22 
possession of marijuana,23 or drinking on the street.24  This arrestee is 
supposed to be arraigned by a judge within twenty-four hours,25 but 
the process often takes much longer.26  In the interim, the arrestee 
spends roughly four to six hours in a precinct holding cell before being 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 17 See FEELEY, supra note 9, at 199; Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Bowers, supra note 6, at 
1119; Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1328; Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2568.  
 18 Sometimes, that can be wearing your pants too low.  People v. Martinez, 905 N.Y.S.2d 847, 
847 (Crim. Ct. 2010).  
 19 New York law characterizes many of these minor offenses as noncriminal violations.   
Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that these offenses create serious long-term problems.  E.g., 
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 383. 
 20 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2008). 
 21 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2015). 
 22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35 (McKinney 2008).  
 23 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008).  
 24 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-125[b] (Westlaw through 2014 legislation).  
 25 See People ex rel. Maxian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam). 
 26 Joseph Goldstein, After Budget Cuts, Defendants’ Wait to See a Judge Often Exceeds 24 
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2011), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 / 0 7 / 2 0 / n y r e g i o n / n e w - y o r k 
-budget-cuts-lead-to-longer-waits-for-arraignment.html. 
  
2015] PROCESS COSTS AND POLICE DISCRETION 273 
transferred to courthouse lockup.27  When he finally sees a judge, if he 
has a record, he is likely to be held on bail that he cannot afford.28  
But even if he is released on his own recognizance, which, for defen-
dants with a criminal record, is unlikely,29 the hassle of a trial — with 
its many courthouse trips, where there might be long lines at secured 
entrances30 — starts to look unmanageable.  He is offered a plea deal 
in which the twenty-four hours he just spent in lockup will in effect 
serve as his sentence.  If he does not take it, he will either remain in 
jail until his trial — which could be a rather long time31 — or be 
forced to attend a series of time-consuming and meaningless court ap-
pearances.32  If the defendant works full-time, these court appearances 
are nearly impossible for him to attend.  And so at arraignment he 
does not contest whatever low-level offense is available and goes 
home.33  Statutory law has no role in this type of prosecution. 
Many have noted the startling lack of process in misdemeanor and 
violation prosecutions generally, as well as the extent to which those 
prosecutions are driven by process costs.34  The picture is bleak in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 What Can I Expect If I’m Arrested?, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, h t t p : / / w w w . l e g a l - a i d . o r g / e n 
/ineedhelp/ineedhelp/criminalproblem/faq/whatcaniexpectifiamarrested.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015) [http://perma.cc/K4D8-AZDB]. 
 28 Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/nyregion/03bail.html. 
 29 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 28 n.75, 29 
tbl.3 (2010), h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / r e p o r t s / u s 1 2 1 0 w e b w c o v e r _ 0 . p d f [h t t p : / / p e r m a 
.cc/NE8R-2G58] (noting that those with a misdemeanor conviction comprised 52.6% of those ar-
rested on misdemeanors in New York City, but only 10.0% of those subsequently released on 
their own recognizance). 
 30 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 386–87; William Glaberson, Faltering Courts, 
Mired in Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2013), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 3 / 0 4 / 1 4 / n y r e g i o n 
/justice-denied-bronx-court-system-mired-in-delays.html.  
 31 Glaberson, supra note 30; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 29, at 2 (reporting 
that the average length of pretrial detention for someone who cannot make bail is 15.7 days).  
 32 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 375 (“[Defendants] must then sit patiently in a 
crowded courtroom, sometimes all day, watching the seemingly inscrutable logic of other cases 
being called and courtroom lulls, waiting for their 60–120 seconds in front of the judge.  When the 
lunch break is called at 1 p.m., the crowd of defendants who have been waiting since 9 a.m. for 
their case to be called invariably express what could be understated as discontent. . . .  If defen-
dants fail to return for their case call after lunch a warrant will [likely] be issued.”).   
 33 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 611 (2014).  In New York City, 78.2% of all misdemeanor arrests result in either a convic-
tion for a noncriminal violation (28.7%), a conviction for a misdemeanor (19.6%), or an adjourn-
ment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) (29.9%), where the charge stays on a defendant’s re-
cord for a year and is reactivated if the defendant is rearrested.  Id. at 647 fig.10.  In this Essay, 
we occasionally refer to “guilty pleas” so as to include the ACD.  This is because only a straight 
dismissal gets you out of court without any record that can come back to haunt you, so agreeing 
to an ACD is tantamount to pleading guilty for our purposes.  
 34 E.g., Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 180 (2008); Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, 
and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1014 
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New York, to be sure — but at least in New York defendants plead 
guilty one at a time.  In some jurisdictions, defendants are read their 
rights and enter their guilty pleas en masse.35  Guilty pleas are a near 
certainty.36  Adjudication, in the sense of determining, say, the factual 
basis of guilt, is absent.37  This world of low-level criminal processing 
does not remotely approach the criminal process taught in law school 
classrooms.  At least one scholar suggests that the misdemeanor system 
in New York is no longer principally concerned with adjudication  
at all — rather, she claims, its goal is to mark defendants with records 
so that they can be effectively sorted in future encounters with the  
system.38 
As a matter of legal doctrine, New York’s disorderly conduct of-
fense is limited in scope and difficult to prove.39  Same with open con-
tainer violations.40  In the tiny minority of cases that do receive actual 
judicial scrutiny, the New York Court of Appeals has espoused a 
common law of disorderly conduct violations that sharply circum-
scribes the extent to which police can use these laws to intrude on in-
dividual liberties.  But these laws routinely underlie convictions of de-
fendants who did not violate, and could not have violated, them.41 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
n.15 (2011/12) (discussing “innocent defendants who plead guilty to avoid the process costs of a 
criminal prosecution, in particular those who have been held long enough in pretrial detention 
that they will get to go home if they accept the prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty in return for a 
sentence of imprisonment that they have already served”); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 
670; Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1328–29.  
 35 Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1329 (citing FEELEY, supra note 9, at 10). 
 36 Id. at 1336. 
 37 Id. at 1317. 
 38 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 614. 
 39 See, e.g., People v. Jones, 878 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (N.Y. 2007) (“The conduct sought  
to be deterred under the statute is ‘considerably more serious than the apparently innocent’  
conduct of defendant here.” (quoting People v. Carcel, 144 N.E.2d 81, 84 (N.Y. 1957))); People v.  
Richardson, 913 N.Y.S.2d 549, 554 (Crim. Ct. 2010) (dismissing complaint for failure to allege 
mens rea of “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,” id. at 552 (quoting N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2008)), where a police officer “observed the defendant shouting 
obscene language to wit: ‘f**k off n[**]ga, stop f**king with me’ in a public area,” id. at 551); 
People v. Stephen, 581 N.Y.S.2d. 981, 982 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (holding that defendant had not en-
gaged in “violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior” within the meaning of Section 240.20 
when he screamed at a police officer “Fuck you . . . If you were in jail, I’d fuck you, you’d be my 
bitch . . . If you didn’t have that gun and badge, I’d kick your ass, I’d kill you,” id. at 982 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted), and where “a crowd of approximately 15–20 people gathered who 
joined the defendant yelling, ‘Yeah, fuck the police,’”  id. at 982–83).  
 40 See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 948 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Crim. Ct. 2012) (dismissing open con-
tainer violation because “[w]hile the arresting officer’s professional training and sense of smell 
may be sufficient to support his conclusion that defendant was drinking beer, such does not sup-
port the conclusion that the beer contained more than one-half of one percent (.005) of alcohol by 
volume because the beverage could have very well been non-alcoholic beer”). 
 41 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86; Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 650 (describing 
disorderly conduct as “an all-purpose generic charge” that does not indicate “that the defendant 
is guilty of any specific illegal conduct”). 
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There are particularly stark examples of this phenomenon: people 
often plead guilty to crimes that, by virtue of either repeal or unconsti-
tutionality, the police can no longer legally enforce.42  In 1993, the Se-
cond Circuit struck down New York’s loitering statute because it vio-
lated the First Amendment on its face and enjoined the City from 
prosecuting charges under the statute.43  Yet between 1992 and 2004, 
the New York City Police Department (NYPD) arrested 1876 people 
for violating that very statute.44  Eddie Wise, one of those defendants, 
was convicted of violating the unconstitutional statute seven times af-
ter it was declared unconstitutional.45  In 2005, local lawyers again 
sued to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute.46  (They won.47)  
But the reminder didn’t stop the NYPD from issuing 641 summonses 
and arresting 58 people for loitering even after the suit was filed.48 
Marijuana arrests present an equally stark example.  In New York, 
possession of marijuana in public view is a misdemeanor.49  But, since 
1977, having marijuana in your pocket is a noncriminal, nonarrestable 
violation.50  Between 1996 and 2011, New York City alone made 
586,320 arrests for possession of marijuana in public view.51  In most 
of these arrests, the marijuana “becomes ‘open to public view’ only 
after the police stop individuals and either ask them to empty their 
pockets or conduct a frisk.”52  Local public defenders, because they 
were concerned that these arrests “present[ed] clear constitutional and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86. 
 43 See Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 701, 705–06 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 44 See Bowers, supra note 10, at 85–86. 
 45 Elva Rodriguez et al., Beggar Gets Change, Wins Suit Forcing City to Lay Off Panhandlers, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 11, 2005, 12:00 AM), h t t p : / / w w w . n y d a i l y n e w s . c o m / a r c h i v e s 
/ n e w s / b e g g a r - c h a n g e - w i n s - s u i t - f o r c i n g - c i t y - l a y - p a n h a n d l e r s - a r t i c l e - 1 . 6 2 4 5 2 7 [h t t p : / / p e r m a . c c 
/ 5 5 7 A - M Y P 3].  Professor Josh Bowers was Eddie Wise’s attorney, and describes Wise’s story in 
greater detail in Bowers, supra note 10, at 85. 
 46 Bowers, supra note 10, at 86; Rodriguez et al., supra note 45. 
 47 Rodriguez et al., supra note 45. 
 48 Kati Cornell Smith, Beggar Buster Blues — Judge Blasts NYPD, N.Y. POST (Nov. 30, 
2006, 5:00 AM), h t t p : / / n y p o s t . c o m / 2 0 0 6 / 1 1 / 3 0 / b e g g a r - b u s t e r - b l u e s - j u d g e - b l a s t s - n y p d [h t t p : / / p e r m a 
.cc/NFE4-8NEG].  
 49 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008).  
 50 1977 N.Y. Laws 478–83 (codified at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008)).  
 51 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A RED HERRING: MARIJUANA ARRESTEES DO NOT 
BECOME VIOLENT FELONS 1 (2012), h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / r e p o r t s / u s 
_ m j 1 1 1 2 w e b w c o v e r . p d f [h t t p : / / p e r m a . c c / X 9 9 Z - N 7 C 4].  We thank Issa Kohler-Hausmann, a coau-
thor of this report, for her helpful comments on this point.  
 52 Id. at 11 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.10).    
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evidentiary problems,”53 began trying to take these cases to trial.  
They were unable to try a single case.54 
How this happens is no mystery.  The process costs so outweigh the 
defendant’s perceived costs of pleading guilty that it seems to make 
very little sense to contest even patently invalid charges.  Almost ev-
eryone pleads guilty,55 even though many did not commit (or could not 
have committed) the charged offense.  This is because successfully 
fighting the charge is worse for the defendant, at least in the short run, 
than pleading guilty.  The Fourth Amendment, then, imposes no re-
strictions on police behavior in this realm of criminal punishment, be-
yond the distant possibility of a § 1983 civil rights suit.56  Because the 
police can be confident that a trial on these charges is at worst a re-
mote possibility, the exclusion remedy for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions is meaningless. 
These public order arrests create a cascade of problems for those 
defendants who are frequently stopped by the police.  In well-studied 
New York, a defendant’s first misdemeanor arrest often results in an 
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD), where the charge is 
dismissed after a year if the defendant stays out of trouble.57  But if 
the defendant gets rearrested within the next year, the ACD usually 
results in a worse offer from the prosecution, and often a formal con-
viction for the offense on which he was rearrested.58  And, during the 
year the ACD is pending, potential employers can see (and make deci-
sions on the basis of) the arrestee’s record.59 
But while prosecutors may aim for criminal convictions, the police 
have much less reason to care about dispositions for loitering, disorder-
ly conduct, or open-container arrests.  At least in theory, in some cir-
cumstances, they ought to care only about the arrest and pre-
arraignment detention.60  With rare exceptions, once the very low-level 
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 53 Marijuana Arrest Project, BRONX DEFENDERS, h t t p : / / w w w . b r o n x d e f e n d e r s . o r g / p r o g r a m s 
/the-marijuana-arrest-project (last visited Apr. 9, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2CFC-AXBR].  
 54 William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Apr. 30, 2013), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 3 / 0 5 / 0 1 / n y r e g i o n / j u s t i c e - d e n i e d - f o r - m i s d e m e a n o r 
-cases-trials-are-elusive.html. 
 55 Or, in New York, accepts an ACD that stays on his record for a year.  Kohler-Hausmann, 
supra note 33, at 648–50.  
 56 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 57 See supra note 33.  
 58 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 668 (“If a defendant with [an ACD] from a prior arrest 
is brought back to criminal court on a new arrest, the offer on the new case will go up along one 
vector or another — the seriousness of the mark, the conditions he must satisfy to be granted the 
disposition, or the formal sentence.” ). 
 59 See id. at 648.  Indeed, the purpose of New York’s misdemeanor system may be to mark 
defendants so that they can be treated differently when they are subsequently arrested.  See id. at 
649. 
 60 See generally FEELEY, supra note 9. 
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defendant is arrested, the police have accomplished their immediate 
goal of maintaining order.  Of course, the defendant is also prosecuted, 
convicted, and permanently marked by the system, but these fallen 
dominos are hard to pin on the police.  The public expects the police to 
maintain order, but when an arrest is necessary, the law often arms of-
ficers — at least officially — with only the powerful and blunt tools of 
criminal law.  This is a destructive mismatch: public order or “quality 
of life” policing is conducted almost entirely outside the shadow of 
substantive criminal law and almost entirely within the discretion of 
the police.61 
The problem stems from the misalignment of purposes between the 
police, who primarily (and optimistically) seek to prevent crime and 
keep streets safe, and district attorneys, who focus more immediately 
on pursuing chargeable offenses.62  Prosecutorial involvement in a case 
typically begins when someone has already been arrested.  At least ac-
cording to some, prosecutors are interested in minimizing the risk that 
a defendant emerges from the system without being “marked” so that, 
in the event the person reoffends, the prosecutor is not blamed.63  
Prosecutors are not well positioned to weed out those public order ar-
rests that should never have led to a criminal conviction.  The police, 
on the other hand, are expected to enforce public order.  They likely 
care less about the escalating penalties of the criminal system than 
prosecutors do.  But when the police make public order arrests, they 
(perhaps inadvertently) start a process of escalating punishment that is 
ill suited to the task of order maintenance.64 
“Criminal” public order enforcement is counterproductive in other 
ways.  For one, it erodes the label “crime.”  When we ask the police to 
maintain public order, we do not ask them to focus on crime or to ar-
rest criminals as the typical person uses those terms.  We ask them to 
regulate behavior that may inadvertently create some risk to the pub-
lic; to deter chronic low-level misconduct that doesn’t rise to the level 
of criminality;65 and even to be our primary — and maybe exclu-
sive — agent for dealing with people with substance abuse problems, 
the mentally ill, and the homeless.66  Calling this sort of policing 
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 61 See generally Livingston, supra note 8.  
 62 See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33 (arguing that prosecutors’ principal goal in 
misdemeanor and violation cases — in New York, at least — is to mark defendants for future 
encounters). 
 63 Id. at 667–68 (citing an interview with a New York public defender).  
 64 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 668–70. 
 65 See generally Ellickson, supra note 8. 
 66 See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 9 (1977) (“The police have come 
to be viewed as capable of handling every emergency.”); Peter C. Patch & Bruce A. Arrigo, Police 
Officer Attitudes and Use of Discretion in Situations Involving the Mentally Ill, 22 INT’L J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 23, 23 (1999).  
  
278 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 128:268 
“criminal” makes the term mean less,67 and therefore makes it less 
powerful, eroding any deterrent or expressive value of a criminal sanc-
tion.68  Worse still, this approach brands as “criminals” many who 
have merely offended other people’s sensibilities or who have engaged 
in what almost everyone agrees is very minor misconduct that in reali-
ty very rarely poses a risk to physical safety.69 
Because defendants cannot (realistically) contest the charges against 
them, policing outside the substantive law also leaves no account of 
what happened — or why.70  The sentence imposed is in effect sub-
verted by the process, which ought to be administrative and incident 
to punishment, not the punishment itself.  Cases are often resolved at 
arraignment,71 and very rarely at trial,72 so there is no record of why 
the system punished someone.  All we’ll ever know is that someone 
was convicted of “disorderly conduct.”73  Those who read the record 
might think the worst.74  A criminal record is chief among the unin-
tended and unnecessary costs generated by relying on criminal law to 
maintain public order.  A person arrested for an essentially noncrimi-
nal public order offense becomes part of the criminal system alongside 
those guilty of genuinely transgressive conduct and about whom socie-
ty would agree on assigning the label “criminal.”  Because of the wide 
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 67 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586 (2005) (arguing that 
prosecutors must consider the signals their prosecutions send to the public). 
 68 See Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 155 
(1951) (“To stigmatise the ordinary person by the epithets ‘criminal,’ ‘offender,’ and ‘conviction,’ 
is itself a punishment, and, from a deterrent point of view, it is important that the emotion in-
voked by these words should be kept at full strength and not weakened by their indiscriminate 
application.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2550 (identifying “a basic irony about criminal 
law: the more it expands, the less it matters”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Be-
tween Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997).  
 69 Cf. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans.,  
Free Press 1984) (1893) (defining “criminal” acts as those that shock the collective conscience of 
society). 
 70 Indeed, New York City has refused to disclose (and may not even have kept track of) how 
many convictions were generated in non-felony cases between 2002 to 2010.  Ray Rivera & Al 
Baker, Data Elusive on Low-Level Crime in New York City, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/nyregion/02secrecy.html. 
 71 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 654 (“In New York City over 57% of all misdemeanor 
and violation cases reach a disposition at arraignment.”). 
 72 See id. at 650 (noting that fewer than 0.5% of misdemeanor cases go to trial). 
 73 Consider Michigan law, which criminalizes being a “disorderly person” but “provides no 
standards as to what is a public disturbance.”  People v. Gagnon, 341 N.W.2d 867, 869 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1983) (per curiam). 
 74 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 650 (“In practice, a ‘dis con’ serves as an all-
purpose generic charge to mark the defendant for a specific length of time, not to indicate that the 
defendant is guilty of any specific illegal conduct.”); cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
189 (1997) (expressing concern that when a prior conviction is an element of an offense, withhold-
ing the facts of the earlier case “may be like saying, ‘never mind what’s behind the door,’ and 
jurors may well wonder what they are being kept from knowing”).  
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variety of conduct covered by public order prosecutions, employers are 
unlikely to bother drawing distinctions. 
Is there a justification for uniformly marking arrestees with crimi-
nal convictions in the context of public order offenses? Certain classes 
of low-level offenses are apparently poor predictors of serious criminal-
ity in the future.75  In some jurisdictions, the probability of being con-
victed of a more serious low-level offense, as opposed to a less serious 
one, is chiefly a function of how long it has been since the individual’s 
last arrest.76  Because people in highly policed areas are arrested at 
much higher rates, the combination of these facts likely produces a 
cascade of arrests and convictions that have little relationship to the 
goals of public order policing (and much more to do with a person’s 
neighborhood and race). 
Finally, there is simply the matter of how much all of this costs.  
Public order arrests often result in a lengthy period of pre-arraignment 
detention77 — perhaps well in excess of the sentence any institutional 
actor would rationally want to impose for the “violation.”   The de-
fendant is processed by the court system’s personnel and in its build-
ings and is provided a court-appointed lawyer.  All of this jailing and 
processing translates into a nontrivial amount of money and, in any 
event, imposes needless suffering. 
The debate about police discretion cannot move forward as long as 
the police are compelled to use extralegal means to police public order 
by imposing criminal punishment.  Using the process in this way inter-
feres with other institutional actors’ ability to limit police discretion: as 
it stands today, most discretionary arrests result in a conviction with 
serious consequences.  In these arrests, everything seems to have gone 
right, so the public — including much of the legal academy — contin-
ues to think that the text of the substantive law can meaningfully con-
strain police behavior.78 
II.  THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF POLICE DISCRETION 
There has long been a vigorous debate over how much discretion 
to give the police in initiating street encounters and making low-level 
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 75 See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 674–76 (describing the results of an empirical 
study of New York City arrest data).  
 76 See id. at 690. 
 77 See Goldstein, supra note 26 (describing pre-arraignment detentions lasting up to three days 
and an average detention length of thirty-one hours).  
 78 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 561 (“Courts cannot ‘solve’ the problem of police dis-
cretion by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws — as some have attempted — with-
out seriously impairing legitimate community efforts to enhance the quality of neighborhood 
life.”). 
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arrests.79  This debate is alive today in the fight over New York’s con-
troversial stop-and-frisk policy and its practice of arresting people for 
marijuana possession.80  Some scholars claim that the density of urban 
spaces requires new forms of police discretion to maintain “social 
norms” and to smooth community tensions.81  They argue that the in-
creasing empowerment of black communities means that the Constitu-
tion should leave them alone to “protect themselves through the politi-
cal process.”82  Courts should no longer be suspicious that public order 
laws are designed to keep black people out of community life because, 
the argument goes, black communities increasingly write those laws 
themselves.83 
The early incarnation of this debate centered on City of Chicago v. 
Morales,84 which involved a broad antigang loitering ordinance that 
allegedly gave police the power to arrest (or harass) whomever they 
wanted.  The ordinance essentially criminalized “remain[ing] in one 
place with no apparent purpose.”85  Some maintained that this lan-
guage was fatally overbroad and gave the police inordinate discretion 
to arrest people for innocent conduct86 — the Court agreed — while 
others argued that this broad language was necessary for the police to 
do their jobs and maintain order for the benefit of minority communi-
ties.87  This debate implicitly assumes, however, that you can have ei-
ther specific criminal laws that constrain the police, or very general 
laws that allow the police broad discretion.88  This is a false dichoto-
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 79 Compare, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998), Livingston, supra note 8, and Meares & Kahan, supra 
note 14, with Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 14, Cole, supra note 15, and Natapoff, supra note 
4. 
 80 E.g., Joseph Goldstein, Marijuana May Mean Ticket, Not Arrest, in New York City, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 4 / 1 1 / 1 0 / n y r e g i o n / i n - s h i f t - p o l i c e - d e p t - t o - s t o p 
- l o w - l e v e l - m a r i j u a n a - a r r e s t s - o f f i c i a l s - s a y . h t m l; Editorial, The Truth Behind Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2011), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 / 0 9 / 0 3 / o p i n i o n / t h e - t r u t h - b e h i n d - s t o p - a n d 
-frisk.html. 
 81 See, e.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 79, at 1163–64.  
 82 Cole, supra note 15, at 1061 (citing Kahan & Meares, supra note 79).  
 83 Id. 
 84 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
 85 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Morales is the most recent in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated local quality-
of-life ordinances on vagueness grounds.  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 
611 (1971).  
 86 Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 14, at 225–37. 
 87 Meares & Kahan, supra note 14, at 209–14. 
 88 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 777–78 (1999) (“For the last several 
decades, conservative commentators have called for a relaxation of the vagueness doctrine as well 
as procedural restraints on police discretion to permit bolder law enforcement efforts to investi-
gate, punish, and prevent crime.”). 
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my.  What the law says — the specific conduct it defines and criminal-
izes — does little to constrain police discretion in the enforcement of 
very low-level violations.  The need to control police discretion could 
hardly be more important, but in the context of public order offenses, 
it has at best a very weak connection with substantive criminal law.89 
Regardless of how offenses are defined, the police can still use them 
to generate convictions by using the process to force guilty pleas.  
Therefore, by focusing primarily on the content of substantive law, 
policymakers pay too little attention to the real agent of criminal pun-
ishment in this setting: the process costs of a criminal arrest. 
To illustrate this disconnect, consider an example.  Imagine that 
drinking on the street — a very specific activity — were no longer 
prohibited in a particular city.  Someone is then arrested for drinking 
on the street in this city even though drinking on the street no longer 
violates any criminal or administrative rule.  If he is offered a plea 
bargain at his arraignment, he will probably take it, as the previous 
Part shows.  Thus, if the police encounter someone drinking on the 
street in a manner that they find disruptive or objectionable, they can 
(and also clearly know they can) still arrest that person despite the fact 
that drinking on the street is no longer against the rules. 
The disconnect stems from a fact that has been true of lower courts 
since at least the 1950s: the process is the punishment.90  Beginning 
with the “due process revolution,”91 when the Bill of Rights was in-
corporated against the states, lower courts have used the process of ad-
judication to enforce substantive norms of behavior.  Because they are 
no longer able — at least formally — to enforce order without fairly 
extensive process, the criminal system evolved to use the costs that the 
process generates to enforce order.92 
But the political system and much of the legal academy continues 
to believe that code reforms can serve to control police discretion.  In-
deed, in response to the criticism that marijuana arrests do almost 
nothing to protect public safety,93 “New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo introduced legislation to make possession of marijuana in pub-
lic view a non-arrestable, non-criminal violation,” just like possession 
in your pocket.94  Despite support from all five New York City district 
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 89 Contra, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 561 (“Courts cannot ‘solve’ the problem of police 
discretion by invalidating reasonably specific public order laws — as some have attempted — 
without seriously impairing legitimate community efforts to enhance the quality of neighborhood 
life.”).  
 90 FEELEY, supra note 9.  
 91 E.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT’S 
IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970).   
 92 E.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 10, at 374–81.  
 93 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 19.  
 94 Id. at 4. 
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attorneys,95 the legislation failed because of opposition from upstate 
and suburban legislators.96  Both sides of this debate neglected the re-
ality that code reforms cannot alone control police discretion.  In other 
words, even if the legislation passed, if the NYPD wanted to continue 
arresting people for marijuana possession in public view — despite the 
fact that it would have become a nonarrestable offense under the 
law — there would be nothing to stop them. 
Other norms and institutions are much better suited to constrain 
police discretion.  Indeed, the political process that led to the passage 
of Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance may have strongly influenced 
police behavior in favor of aggressive enforcement and vigorous public 
order policing.97  Civilian oversight can constrain police discretion.98  
So can consent decrees with the Justice Department.99  Perhaps most 
importantly, law enforcement departmental norms can restrain discre-
tion.100  But in the context of minor crimes — the lowest level of crim-
inal punishment — police discretion appears to be largely immune to 
substantive criminal law. 
Fortunately, there is reason to be hopeful about the possibility for 
reform in our cities.  After the legislation in New York to decriminal-
ize marijuana possession in open view failed, the political movement 
behind those substantive reforms continued to apply pressure to politi-
cal actors to change practice, if not the law.  Turning their focus away 
from the criminal code, opponents of marijuana arrests were able to 
persuade New York City simply to stop making them.101  
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 95 Each borough of New York City has its own district attorney. 
 96 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 5; Thomas Kaplan & John Eligon, Divide in 
Albany Kills Proposal on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 2 
/06/20/nyregion/cuomo-bill-on-marijuana-doomed-by-republican-opposition.html. 
 97 Professors Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan argue rancorously with Professors Albert 
Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer about how the political process in Chicago ended up generating 
the anti-gang loitering ordinance.  Compare Meares & Kahan, supra note 14, at 199–200 (claiming 
that black communities on the South and West Sides of Chicago birthed the ordinance), and 
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Black, White, and Gray: a Reply to Alschuler and 
Schulhofer, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, 247–51 (same), with Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 
14, at 217–20 (arguing that aldermen from predominantly white wards were the real movers be-
hind the ordinance).  Both sides do agree that the process was loud, open, and unusually promi-
nent in the eyes of citizens and police.  
 98 See generally Merrick Bobb, Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151 (2003).  
 99 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 140–44 (1998), h t t p : / / w w w . h r w . o r g / r e p o r t s 
/ p d f s / u / u s / u s p o l 9 8 6 . p d f [h t t p : / / p e r m a . c c / G T A 6 - A U C P] (discussing consent decrees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 14141); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on 
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 844–47 (1999).  
 100 Cf., e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dan-
gerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).  
 101 Goldstein, supra note 80. 
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It is important to recognize the limits of our claim.  In prosecutions 
for serious crimes, the substantive scope of criminal conduct really 
does matter.  As the ratio of the expected sentence to the threatened 
process costs grows, plea bargaining outcomes increasingly mirror trial 
outcomes.102  It thus matters whether drugs are illegal.  It matters very 
little, however, whether Chicago criminalizes loitering with “no ap-
parent purpose” or “causing a disturbance.”  Similarly, our claim is 
limited to relatively large jurisdictions, where the process costs are 
high.  Smaller jurisdictions may function quite differently. 
Finally, this entire discussion is not to say that the text of the crim-
inal code does nothing, even in the context of low-level crimes.  Crimi-
nal prohibitions send important signals to the public and to the police 
about the scope of proper conduct.103  They can have a tremendously 
important expressive value, outlining for the citizenry conduct that is 
to be encouraged and conduct that ought to be forbidden.  They can 
send important messages to the police about the proper scope of their 
ability to intrude on individual liberty.  Our point here is only that, 
whatever they do, criminal codes do not meaningfully constrain police 
discretion in the context of public order offenses. 
III.  REDUCING PROCESS COSTS AND  
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
High process costs of low-level criminal adjudication are the prob-
lem.  The police can — at their discretion and unconstrained by sub-
stantive criminal law in any meaningful way — impose draconian, but 
often unnecessary, even counterproductive, costs on defendants and 
their families.  The police do not necessarily do this out of spite or in-
competence.  They simply need tools to police public order (often by 
making arrests), and criminal law is usually all that they have. 
We offer one potential solution: in order to reduce the harm of dis-
cretionary, low-level arrests — by limiting the process costs and col-
lateral consequences they can generate — we propose a stripped-
down, civil form of arrest, the consequences of which include only the 
arrest itself and a brief period of noncriminal detention.104  
Counterintuitively, we believe that the availability of such a tool will 
cause police to use their power to arrest someone for a crime less often, 
not more.  An important historical analog to this approach is the 
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 102 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2550–58. 
 103 For a tiny sample of the vast literature on this subject, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Lawrence v. 
Texas and the Limits of the Criminal Law, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33–34 & n.145 (2007) 
(citing Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1623 
(1998) (book review)).   
 104 We discuss briefly below why we believe this proposal is unlikely to significantly increase 
the volume of total arrests.  
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“drunk tank,” in which officers would lock up dangerously inebriated 
people to sober up overnight.105  No formal criminal process need be 
involved and no criminal record would result.  Although the debate 
about police discretion has centered on the substantive scope of low-
level regulation, we focus on the real-world process of arresting people 
for low-level offenses and seek a way to avoid criminal records and 
disproportionate, socially wasteful costs.  If the police are going to en-
force public order through discretionary arrests, society would benefit 
from providing law enforcement with the legal instruments to do so 
safely, effectively, and legitimately. 
To be more specific, we propose complementing (or, alternatively, 
replacing) public order crimes with a class of civil ordinances that al-
low only very brief detentions.  First, these ordinances should strictly 
limit the total time of detention imposed — including the sentence and 
the period that anyone can be detained on suspicion of a violation — 
to twenty-four hours at the very longest.106  Ideally, the limit would be 
even shorter.  The ordinances should not allow for the imposition of 
fines or monetary payments of any kind.  Second, the ordinances 
should permit an arrestee to attack the legitimacy of his detention ex 
post via mail or telephone and to waive in-person arraignment or any 
other appearance requirement.  Lastly, these ordinances should be 
noncriminal and should not, under any circumstances, leave the de-
fendant with a recorded violation of any kind.  The police should be 
required to retain reliable records of whom they arrested and why, but 
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 105 See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 8, at 640; see also Joshua Partlow, Holiday Rush at Mexico 
City’s Hangover Prison, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2013), h t t p : / / w w w . w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / w o r l d / t h e 
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tween the authority of the police in matters of crime and the authority of police in matters of or-
der.  For example, the Statute of Winchester, which established London’s first police force in 
1285, provided that watchmen were authorized and charged “‘as . . . in Times [passed]’ to ‘watch 
the Town continually all Night, from the Sun-setting unto the Sun-rising’ and were directed that 
‘if any Stranger do pass by them, he shall be arrested until Morning.’”  Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333 (2001) (quoting Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 4 
(Eng.)); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten 
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of 
Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 58 (2007) (“‘A watchman may arrest a night walker by a warrant in 
law.’ . . . In effect, being out after dark in town was so suspicious that it was grounds for a tem-
porary arrest . . . .” (quoting 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF 
ENGLAND 52 (1642))).  We thank Josh Bowers for his helpful comment on this point.  
 106 New York currently has serious problems complying with a twenty-four-hour deadline for 
arraignments.  See Goldstein, supra note 26.  That said, this deadline should be much easier to 
comply with, though compliance is by no means a certainty.  
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those records should be accessible to the public only in a reliably 
anonymous form.107 
These features serve to reduce the unnecessary harm that low-level 
criminal arrests ultimately impose on arrestees.  No longer will there 
be any reason for you to plead guilty to time served or to accept an 
ACD-like outcome — you will already have served the maximum 
penalty you can receive.  No longer will there be any reason to plead 
guilty to avoid trial.  You can conduct a paper adjudication if you 
want to vindicate your version of events, or just let it go — either 
way, you will not wind up with a criminal record.  Lastly, no matter 
what happens, you’re back home in twenty-four hours or less.108 
Such laws would still allow the police to do all the things public 
order policing enthusiasts expect them to do.  Rarely, if ever, do the 
police need more than a twenty-four-hour detention to accomplish the 
goals of public order policing: disrupting and isolating, primarily.  If 
the police believe that more than twenty-four hours of detention is ap-
propriate, then other policing goals are in play, and the police should 
typically arrest for a more serious crime for which the defendant 
should be charged and tried.  In this situation, the criminal system be-
comes appropriate, and the plea bargaining process functions better 
because the sentence the defendant would face upon conviction often 
exceeds the process costs of fighting the charge.109  Our goal is simply 
to provide the police with tools that allow them, in appropriate situa-
tions, to avoid high process costs and unnecessary collateral conse-
quences while maintaining public order. 
When police arrest people for low-level crimes, they seek a wide 
variety of ends, depending on the context.  Sometimes police want to 
clear a corner where drug dealers are congregating.110  Sometimes they 
want to send a signal to a neighborhood that they are in control.111  
Often, police are maintaining a sense of order in the community, even 
manifesting that order through the regulation of physical spaces.112  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 Cf. Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1751 (2014) (discussing various aspects of anonymity in the modern legal 
structure).  
 108 To again use New York City as an example, these detentions should be at the local station 
house, rather than in the currently overcrowded jails.  Even short periods of time in overcrowded 
jails can be traumatizing and degrading.  Station-house lockups — where police are generally 
present nearby and periods of detention are very brief — should serve to minimize the cruelty of 
detention. 
 109 See Stuntz, supra note 11, at 2563–64. 
 110 See Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1332. 
 111 See id. at 1333. 
 112 See, e.g., William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of 
Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447 (1995) (NYPD Commissioner discussing the city’s ef-
forts at policing quality-of-life crimes); Robert C. Ellickson, supra note 8; Dan M. Kahan, Reci-
procity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513 (2002). 
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They are almost always our front-line responders to mental illness and 
substance abuse; thus police arrest people to keep them safe or ensure 
that they receive care.113  Sometimes the police have illegitimate rea-
sons.114  But no matter why the police make public order arrests, they 
should rarely be invested in whether the person they’ve arrested is ul-
timately convicted.  The ordinances we suggest leave the police equal-
ly effective at maintaining order, but eliminate entanglement in the 
criminal process as a near-certain result.  And, similarly, by lowering 
process costs, the proposed ordinances can bring public order policing 
aboveboard, allowing the debate about how much discretion the police 
should have to occur on more productive terrain. 
We recognize that police departments may want to use low-level 
arrests to incapacitate or simply to keep track of people they worry 
may pose a threat.  With respect to the former possibility, police may 
use low-level arrests to keep potentially violent criminals off the street 
for more than a few days,115 although the evidence suggests that this 
approach is unlikely to be effective.116  For better or worse, our pro-
posal does not eliminate the police’s ability make such arrests, al-
though it may frustrate certain plausible law enforcement aims.  The 
police may be concerned, for instance, about the long-term trajectory 
of chronic low-level violators.  By arresting people for, say, drinking 
on the street, police can keep track of how many times a person has 
been caught drinking in public and can escalate his punishment ac-
cordingly.  By allowing an individual police officer to use an unrecord-
ed, noncriminal arrest, our proposal may interfere with the ability of 
the police to achieve this goal. 
In theory, a system of criminal misdemeanors may serve many 
purposes: it may seek to punish, to deter, and to mark.  It may even 
serve to incapacitate.  But the current system achieves these purposes 
at significant expense.  From our perspective, the issue in the public 
order policing domain is the disparity between the purposes of the po-
lice in some circumstances (short-term incapacitation) and the costs of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 113 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 66, at 9.  
 114 Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-animated Justice or Franken-
stein’s Monster?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299–1300 nn.1–7 (2013) (reviewing STEPHANOS 
BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012)) (collecting books and articles on the 
subject of policing and punishment in the United States). 
 115 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 16 n.47 (“[W]e need[] to be more se-
lective about who [sic] we [are] arresting on quality-of-life infractions.  When a team of cops fills 
up a van with arrestees, the booking process can take those cops out of service for a whole day in 
some cities.  The public can’t afford to lose that much police protection for a bunch of first-time 
offenders, so the units enforcing quality-of-life laws [must] be sent where the maps show concen-
trations of crime or criminals, and the rules governing the stops have to be designed to catch the 
sharks, not the dolphins.” (first alteration in original) (quoting JACK MAPLE, THE CRIME 
FIGHTER: PUTTING THE BAD GUYS OUT OF BUSINESS 155–56 (1999))). 
 116 See id. at 16–18 (disputing public safety benefits of marijuana arrests). 
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the formal criminal misdemeanor system.  We can accomplish short-
term incapacitation in a much more humane and less costly way.  Pub-
lic order policing issues are in large part noncriminal, and diverting 
low-level violators from the criminal system will provide a fairer and 
lower-cost alternative to the current practice. 
This paper does not take a position on the appropriate amount of 
discretion to give the police in maintaining public order.  Nonetheless, 
assume for the moment that whatever the optimal level of discretion 
happens to be, police in many big cities currently have too much; and 
assume that, as a separate matter, police arrest people too often.  You 
might think that our proposal will make both of these problems worse, 
not better.  In response to the first concern (too much discretion), the 
current system appears to constrain police minimally in this area of 
criminal law — if it constrains them at all — so our proposal will not 
free the police much more than the status quo already does.  We have 
a similar response to those who are concerned that our proposal would 
weaken defendants’ ability to fight the underlying merits of their 
claims: they have very little ability to do so at present, so, at worst, our 
proposal is neutral. 
With respect to the concern that our proposal will lead to more ar-
rests, though, we are more cautious.  Perhaps the hassle of a formal 
criminal arrest under the current system provides some disincentive to 
the police.  If our proposal makes it faster and easier for the police to 
arrest people, the argument goes, they will do it more.  But there is no 
good reason to believe that an arrest leading to civil detention under 
our proposal is (or has to be) any less difficult than a formal criminal 
arrest is today for the police.  For prosecutors, defense lawyers, court 
personnel, and judges, our system eliminates a tremendous amount of 
work.  The police, on the other hand, still have to arrest someone, lock 
him up, and fill out paperwork explaining why. 
If these civil arrests are no easier on police, however, one might 
next wonder: why would the police even bother with these new tools 
when they can arrest someone for basically any reason without them?  
To this we have two responses.  First, we emphasize that, because po-
lice discretion at present is hardly constrained at all, our proposal can-
not make the situation worse.  Even if only a few police officers use 
the new tools because they recognize the unnecessary costs and conse-
quences that an arrest for a low-level crime can generate for the of-
fender or his family, a few is better than none.  Second, we hope that 
policymakers will give police officers incentives to use these new tools 
in appropriate circumstances.  We note that any policy or practice that 
makes a criminal arrest more costly to police in absolute terms (e.g., 
requiring an additional explanation for why the police officer preferred 
a criminal arrest to a civil arrest) would in theory induce police to use 
the civil tools without increasing the total number of arrests.  But, 
more generally, what incentives policymakers, the press, the bar, or 
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police departments might employ, and how they would be implement-
ed, is a matter for another essay. 
Our proposal might also prompt someone to ask: Why do police 
need to arrest people at all?  If we are concerned about the current sys-
tem of meaningless pleas and useless process, why not scrap it alto-
gether?  Police, indeed, use a wide array of nonarrest techniques to 
calm situations and ease tensions — why must they arrest? 
In reply, we simply point to the fact that police under the current 
system arrest people for very low-level crimes all the time.117  If we 
simply removed prohibitions on public order offenses from the statute 
books, there is actually no solid reason to believe people would not 
continue to be arrested for violating them anyway — or that police 
would not arrest people for a more serious crime, perhaps exacerbating 
the current situation.118  The importance of the debate about how 
much discretion to afford the police — and about how much public 
conduct to prohibit — cannot be understated, but we do not believe 
significant progress can be made simply by reforming the criminal 
code.  Police almost certainly arrest people too often, but this reality is 
not driven by the substantive content of criminal prohibitions.  If our 
proposal is adopted and a less destructive form of arrest becomes es-
tablished, we can turn to other, more productive, means to advance 
the debate over police discretion to arrest.119 
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 117 See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 645.  
 118 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.  
 119 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.  
